ABSTRACT Smart meters have been widely applied in the smart grid, and they enable two-way communication in the smart grid. User's electricity consumption data and other data are transmitted between the entities. It is necessary to ensure the security of this two-way communication. Several authentication schemes have been proposed to solve this problem. Recently, Mahmood et al. proposed an authentication scheme for the smart grid. However, we find that their scheme cannot provide the perfect forward secrecy and private key privacy as they have claimed. An improved version by Abbasinezhad is found to be subject to replay attack, too. In this paper, a bilinear map pairing-based authentication and key establish scheme is proposed, which can withstand the aforementioned attacks and achieves more security features, private key privacy, perfect forward privacy, and message integrity. We designed a simpler registration scheme, which implements the same functionalities, while the computation cost is reduced. We also conducted a formal security analysis of the proposed scheme, and the result shows that the proposed scheme is secure. Our simulation results show that the proposed scheme has a comparable communication cost and computation cost.
authentication and key establishment scheme for smart grid. Our contributions are in three folds:
1) First, we analyzed the two existing schemes, we found both of them failed to provide all the security features as they claimed. The discussion is in Section VII. 2) Second, we designed a simpler registration scheme that implements the same functionalities, achieves the same or a higher security level, however, the computation cost is reduced. 3) We came up with a bilinear map pairing based mutual authentication scheme, the proposed scheme achieves more security features compared to related works, perfect forward privacy, message integrity, private key privacy etc., which means it can resist various attacks, replay attack, impersonate attack etc. We conducted a formal analysis of the security features of the proposed scheme, the result shows the proposed scheme is secure. We also validated the proposed scheme using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN logic).
II. RELATED WORK
There are many studies focusing on the authentication problems in smart grid. Some of which are lightweight ones, while some are more secure ones based on asymmetric cryptography. Elliptic curve and bilinear map pairing are two of the most popular asymmetric cryptography suites used in the past studies.
Wu and Zhou's scheme [8] used both the symmetric encryption and the elliptic curve encryption, their scheme is partly based on the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol. Xia and Wang [9] found that the scheme of Wu and Zhou is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack, in the scheme of Xia and Wang (2012) , a trusted third party is introduced. Besides, their scheme enables key revocation. The scheme of Mahmood et al. has been tested by ProVerif and BAN logic, however, their scheme is found to fail to provide perfect forward secrecy by Abbasinezhad and Nikooghadam, besides, in the scheme of Mahmood et al., the network manager knows the private key of the entities, and the shared session keys may be compromised if the ephemeral secrets are leaked. For the scheme of Abbasinezhad and Nikooghadam, we found that their scheme faces a replay attack, although the adversary can not get the session key, the adversary can make this entity inaccessible to its peer entities temporarily, besides, in the first message of their scheme, there is not a signature or a timestamp, a receiver of this message can not know if this message has been tampered or altered by an adversary or not. Liu et al. [10] proposed a 1-RAAP scheme, which preserves anonymity, mutual authentication, non-repudiation and some other desirable security properties, while only requiring users to perform several low-cost computational operations. Li et al. [11] discovered several potential security risks in the scheme of Liu et al., for example, when the information stored in the server is leaked to an adversary, the adversary can mimic as a legitimate server and build a shared key with the user, Li et al. proposed an improved version. In the scheme of Kumari et al. [12] , the private key of the user is generated by the server, so the server knows the private keys of all the users. Wu et al. [13] proposed a smart card based authentication scheme, their scheme can ensure identity anonymity. The scheme of Huang et al. [14] is a lightweight scheme, in their scheme, when a user registers with the server, the server will generate an encrypted identity for the user, and the user uses this new identity to log in next time. Thus the adversary is unable to get the true identity of a user.
The bilinear map pairing is another famous asymmetric cryptography suit used in the smart grid authentication schemes. The scheme of Tsai and Lo [15] is an authentication scheme based bilinear map pairing, the smart meter can be quickly authenticated without the help of a trusted anchor. The scheme of Odelu et al. [16] is also based bilinear map pairing, their scheme provides SK-security under the CK-adversary model. Tseng et al. [17] proposed a list free identity based mutual authentication scheme, the bilinear map pairing was used in their scheme, their scheme has an efficient revocation mechanism in multi-server architectures, the communication cost of this scheme is relatively lower compared with related works. Tsai and Lo [18] proposed an anonymous authentication scheme for the distributed mobile cloud services environment, which enables mobile users to access to different cloud services using only one single private key, the identity privacy is protected in this scheme. Li and Hong [19] proposed a signature scheme for wireless sensor networks and based on the signature scheme they devised a certificate-less access control scheme. The authentication scheme of Li et al. [20] enables batch verification in the message verification process, which significantly reduces the computation cost. Lu et al. [21] proposed a secure and privacy-preserving framework for healthcare emergency, the scheme enables two users to authenticate each other without the help of a trusted third party.
Mahmood et al. [22] proposed a Diffie-Hellman based authentication scheme for the smart grid, RSA and AES are used in their scheme, HMAC is also used in order to maintain message integrity. The scheme of Wang et al. [23] adopts the intrinsic idea of ElGamal encryption, and their scheme achieves user anonymity. Wazid et al. [24] proposed a lightweight authentication scheme, only hash, XOR, and some few symmetric encryption schemes are used. Horng et al. [25] discussed about a privacy-preserving signature scheme. Akhunzada et al. [26] discussed the ''Man-AtThe-End attacks''.
This study is organized in the following way, in Section III we discussed the proposed scheme, Section IV is the formal security analyzation part, in Section V, we conducted a security analysis using BAN logic, we compared the proposed scheme with related works in Section VI and Section VII, Section VIII provides the conclusion of this study. III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME Fig. 1 shows the entities in the system, there is a network manager (NM), which manages all the entities in this system. Every entity is registered with the network manager, the network manager will issue a key pair for each entity. With this key pair, the entity can verify if the peer entity is a legitimate one or not. After verification, the two can build a shared key for further communication. The notions used in this study are listed in Table 1 .
A. INITIALIZATION AND REGISTRATION PHASE
The network manager generates the parameters for an elliptic curve and selects a random number d x as its private key, its public key is computed as: R x = d x · P, then the network manager publishes parameters of this elliptic curve and its public key to all the entities in the system.
When an entity V i wants to join the system, it must be registered with the network manager to get its public key pairs. Here, we suppose the registration messages are sent in a private and secure channel.
1. Entity V i selects a random number k u , and gets R u = k u · P. 2. Entity V i sends {Id i , R u } to the network manager.
After the network manager receives a registration request, it performs the following steps to complete the registration process. 1. Network manager selects a random number k n , and gets
5. Network manager sends {s i , R n } back to entity V i . When entity V i receives {s i , R n }, it calculates R in and its private key d i , the registration process is depicted in Table 2 
will check the correctness of this message by checking the timestamp and the signature. After this, V j prepares a replay message. The detailed steps are described as follows:
1. Entity V j checks the timestamp T 1 , if T 1 is fresh, goes to the next step, otherwise, the scheme ends here. 
Entity
if they are equal, goes to the next step, otherwise, the scheme ends here. 5. Entity V j chooses a random k j1 , and gets R j1 = k j1 · P. 6. Entity V j calculates the shared key as:
When V i receives Id j , R jn , R j1 , h j from V j . V i first computes the shared key SK ij , then V i checks the correctness of the signature. If the signature is correct, V i accepts the shared key SK ij . The whole process is shown in Table 3 and Fig. 3. 1. Entity V i calculates the shared key as:
if they are equal, V i accepts SK ij as the shared key.
Here is the proof of the correctness of the shared key
We prove the correctness of the validation process of a signature R si = d i · R it , after validation, entity V j confirms that this message is from an entity V i with identity Id i and
we can get the following proof.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we conduct a formal security analysis of the proposed scheme.
A. SECURITY OF THE REGISTRATION SCHEME
The security of the registration scheme is based on the computation hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem. Suppose G 1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q, P is a generator of G 1 . Given an element Q of G 1 , it is computationally intractable to find a c ∈ Z * q such that Q = cP.
Theorem 1: The proposed registration scheme is secure against an external adversary if and only if the ECDL problem is unable to be solved in polynomial time.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose there is an efficient algorithm O I that could break the ECDL problem in polynomial time. Suppose R x = Q and d x · P = cP, with algorithm O I , an adversary is able to get the network manager's private key d x . The adversary selects a random R an = (k n + k u ) · P, with R n = k n · P and R u = k u · P, now, the adversary can get a private key
With d a and R an , the adversary can pass the verification process at the authentication phase.
(⇐) Suppose there is an external adversary could break the security of the registration scheme in polynomial time. For this adversary, given a random identity Id a , he is able to find
with which this adversary can pass the verification process at the authentication phase. Based on these information, we can
the adversary is able to find a c = d a such that Q = cP. This apparently contradicts the hardness of the ECDL problem.
B. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication, this is based on the computational hardness of the Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman (ECCDH) problem. Suppose G 1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q, P is a generator of G 1 . For any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , given an instance < aP, bP >, it is computationally intractable to compute cP = abP.
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication if and only if the ECCDH problem is unable to be solved in polynomial time.
We prove the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication in two steps. First, we prove entity V j can verify the legitimacy of entity V i .
Proof: (⇒) Suppose there is an efficient algorithm O I that could break the ECCDH problem. Given an random entity's identity Id i , the corresponding public key R i = d i · P and R in , an adversary can get a random R i1 = k i1 · P, a timestamp T 1 , and a R it = H (Id i ||R in ||R i1 ||T 1 ). Suppose aP = R it and bP = R i = d i · P, the adversary is able to compute cP = abP = d i · R it = R si by using the algorithm O I . Until now, the adversary can generate a message {Id i , R in , R i1 , R si , T 1 }, with which it can pass the verification of entity V j .
(⇐) Suppose there is an adversary could pass the verification process of entity V j , which means the adversary could generate a message
For the ECCDH problem, suppose aP = R it , bP = R i = d i · P and cP = abP = d i · R it = R si , given aP, bP, the adversary is able to compute cP = abP in polynomial time. This apparently contradicts to the hardness of the ECCDH problem. Now, we have proved entity V j can verify the legitimacy of entity V i . Second, we prove entity V i can verify the legitimacy of entity V j .
Proof: (⇒) Suppose there is an efficient algorithm O I that could break the ECCDH problem. Suppose aP = R j = d j · P and bP = R i1 = k i1 · P, an adversary is able to compute cP = abP = d j · R i1 = R jt in polynomial time, which means the adversary can generate a message
), k j1 is a random number. With this message, the adversary can pass the verification of entity V i .
(⇐) Suppose there is an adversary who could pass the verification process of entity V i , which means the adversary could generate a message
. With this message, the adversary can pass the verification process of entity V i , as the SHA-256 is secure, the adversary must have got R jt .
For the ECCDH problem, suppose aP
, an adversary is able to compute cP = abP in polynomial time. This apparently contradicts to the hardness of the ECCDH problem. Now, we have proved that entity V i can verify the legitimacy of entity V j , we get the conclusion that the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication.
C. PERFECT FORWARD PRIVACY
Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (BCDH) problem is thought to be a computational hardness, suppose G 1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q, P is a generator of G 1 . For any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , given an instance < aP, bP, cP >, it is computationally intractable to compute e(P, P) abc . Proof: (⇒) Suppose there is an efficient algorithm O I that could break the BCDH problem in polynomial time.
of an arbitrary past session, an adversary can compute e(P, P)
k i1 by using algorithm O I , which means the adversary is able to get the shared key of an arbitrary past session as:
(⇐) Suppose there is an adversary who could get the session key of an arbitrary past session, for example,
256 is secure, the adversary must have got e R it , R i1
For the BCDH problem, suppose aP
, an adversary is able to compute e(P, P) abc in polynomial time. This apparently contradicts to the hardness of the BCDH problem.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS USING BAN LOGIC
BAN logic is a security analysis tool used to determine if the exchanged information is trustworthy, secure against eavesdropping etc [27] , [28] . In this section, we conduct a security analysis of the proposed scheme using BAN logic. BAN logic can be easily applied and it can give us a quick insight of the authentication protocols. BAN logic makes it possible to reason in a very simple way over the authentication protocols in a formal way, it ensures all the publicly shared key primitives are formalized. When BAN logic is used in the design of an authentication protocol, it helps us to exclude potential faults. It also helps us to optimize the design, for example, to remove the unnecessary actions.
A. NOTIONS AND POSTULATES
First, some symbols and primary postulates are described in Table 4 and Table 5 .
B. MESSAGES AND GOALS
We translate the messages into an idealized form of BAN logic, the results are shown in Table 6 . Let δ t1 = (t 1 , t 2 ) be a time duration, we write (δ t1 ) for (t 1 , t 2 ). Let δ t2 = (t 1 , t 3 ), we write (δ t2 ) for (t 1 , t 3 ). Let X i = {Id i , R in , R i1 }, entity V i claims X i holds in the time interval δ t1 , we can get ( (δ t1 ) , X i ). As ( (δ t1 ) , X i ) is signed with the private key of entity V i , we can get the idealized form of message 1:
, SK }, we can get the idealized form of message 2 as: σ (( (δ t2 ) , X j ) , V j ).
There are two goals for the proposed scheme:
←→ V j . These goals ensure entity V i and entity V j to agree on a shared key SK .
C. ASSUMPTIONS
First, entity V i and entity V j believes the opponent's timestamp, we get assumption A1:
Second, after registration, entities have achieved the correct public key, we get assumptions A3: V i | ≡ PK (R j , V j ) and A4: V j | ≡ PK (R i , V i ). All entities believe that everyone else keeps their private keys private, we get assumptions A5: V i | ≡ (V j ) and assumptions A6: V j | ≡ (V i ).
D. PROOF OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
First, we analyze the idealized form of message 1.
1. Message 1 gives us:
2. According to (1), A4, A6 and the ''once-said for public key crypto systems'' rule:
3. According to A2, (2) and the ''reasoning about duration-stamps'' rule:
4. According to (3) and '' ','-elimination'' rule:
5. As k j1 is randomly created by V j , according to ''#()-introduction'' rule:
6. According to (5) and the ''promotion #'' rule:
7. According to (6) , (4), and '' k ←→ introduction'' rule:
Second, we start to analyze the message 2. 8. Message 2 gives us:
9. According to (8), A3, A5 and the ''once-said for public key crypto systems'' rule:
10. According to A1, (9) and the ''reasoning about duration-stamps'' rule: 11. According to (10) and '' ','-elimination'' rule:
12. As k i1 is randomly created by V i , according to ''#()-introduction'' rule:
13. According to (12) , and the ''promotion #'' rule:
14. According to (13) , (11), and '' k ←→ introduction'' rule:
Now, we have proved the two goals of the scheme. We can say that the proposed scheme is secure under BAN logic.
VI. COMPARISON
In this section, we compared the schemes in computational overhead and communication overhead.
A. COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We simulated the scheme in Java environment, the JDK version is 1.8. The cryptography library used in this study is the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (JPBC) [29] . Type A pairings are constructed on the curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F q for some prime q = 3mod4. Both G 1 , G 2 are the group of points E(F q ). The computation cost of general hash operation is calculated based on the SHA-256. The experiment is conducted on a computer with a 64-bits Windows 7 enterprise operating system, with Intel(R) Core(TM) i73370K CPU 3.5 GHz processor, 8 GB memory. Part of the code has been uploaded to a public library in github.com [30] . The parameters of the curve are listed at Appendix A, q is 256 bit, and order r is 224 bit, we choose these parameters because the recommended elliptic curve key length is 256 bit for 2016-2030 by NIST [31] , and for 2018 -2028 by ECRYPR [32] , the experiment results are shown in Table 8. 1. G bp a bilinear map pairing operation 2. G mul an element of G 1 multiply a big integer operation 3. G add an element addition operation of G 1 4. G h2e a hash to an element of G 1 Table 9 . Fig. 4 shows the computation costs of the registration phase in milliseconds, the horizontal axis indicates the number of registration times; the vertical axis indicates the computation time in milliseconds. Compared to the scheme of Mahmood et al., the proposed scheme needs more computation time, however, in their scheme, the private key of an arbitrary entity is known to the network manager, for the proposed scheme, the network manager is unable to learn the private key of an arbitrary entity, for this reason, the proposed scheme needs more computation time. Compared to the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al., the proposed scheme is more efficient, and the two schemes achieve the same security level.
For the authentication phase, the scheme 5 shows the computation costs of authentication phase in milliseconds; the horizontal axis indicates the number of authentication times; the vertical axis indicates the computation time, the unit is a second. Compared to the proposed scheme, the computation cost of the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al. needs less computation time, about 9.54ms per phase. This is mainly because in their scheme, the first message is not signed by the sender, however, in the proposed scheme, for security reason, every message is signed by the sender, thus the receiver can verify the correctness of the messages. Compared to the scheme of Mahmood et al., the proposed scheme needs almost the same computation time.
However, if we consider the differences and particularities of the implementation of the schemes in different environments, the computation costs of different operations may be different. Let the total running time of Abbasinezhad et al. be T A = 8G mul + 4G add + 2G h2b + 6hash, the total running time of Mahmood et al. be T M = 10G mul +4G add +6G h2b +2hash the total running time of the proposed scheme be T p = 4G bp + 7G mul +2G add +2G h2e +2G h2b +2GT exp +4hash. We can get:
the proposed scheme is more efficient.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The SHA-256 is used in this study, the result of the general hash operation is 256 bit. The bit lengths of an element in G 1 is 512 bit, the order is 224 bit. The bit size of a timestamp is 32 bit, the bit size of an identity is 32 bit.
For the scheme of Mahmood et al., the messages sent at the registration phase are {Id i } and K ip , K is , Id i is an identity, it is 32 bit, K is is a modulo of the order, it is 224 bit, K ip is an element of G 1 , it is 512 bit. The communication cost is 32 + 512 + 224 = 768 bit. At authentication phase, the messages sent between the two entities are Id i , X i , Y i , K ip , t i and Id j , X j , Y j , K jp , t j , Id i and Id j are identities, the bit length are both 32 bit, respectively, X i , K ip , X j , K jp are elements of G 1 , the bit length is 512 bit, Y i , Y j are modulus of the order, they are both For the proposed scheme, the messages sent at the registration phase are {Id i , R u } and {s i , R n } , Id i is an identity, it is 32 bit, s i is a modulo of the order, it is 224 bit, R u and R n are elements of G 1 , they are both 512 bit. The communication cost is 32 + 512 * 2 + 224 = 1280 bit. At authentication phase, the messages sent between the two entities are {Id i , R in , R i1 , R si , T 1 } and Id j , R jn , R j1 , h j . Id i and Id j are both identities, the bit length is 32 bit, R in , R i1 , R jn , R j1 , R si are elements of G 1 , the bit length is 512 bit, h j is the result of SHA-256, it is 256 bit, T 1 is a timestamp, the communication cost of the authentication phase is 32 * 2+512 * 5+256+32 = 2912 bit. The results are shown in Table 11 . Fig. 6 shows the communication overhead of the registration phase, although the communication cost of the scheme of Mahmood et al. is lower, however, in their scheme, the private key of an arbitrary entity is known to the network manager. Fig. 7 shows the communication overhead for authentication phase, the horizontal axis indicates the number of times; the vertical axis indicates the communication cost in bits, although the communication cost of the proposed scheme is higher. However, compared to the scheme of Mahmood et al., the proposed scheme have more security features; compared to the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al., in the proposed scheme only two messages needs to be sent, while in their scheme 3 messages need to be sent, besides, in the message 1 of their scheme, there is not a timestamp or a signature, the receiver cannot check the integrity and the source of this message.
VII. SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON
We compare the security features of different schemes, the result is shown in Table 12 .
A. REPLAY ATTACK
When it comes to replay attack, in the proposed scheme, there is a timestamp T 1 in the message {Id i , R in , R i1 , R si , T 1 }, besides, the timestamp T 1 is also concealed in R si , if an adversary sends a former message, the entity will abandon this message after checking the timestamp. However, if the adversary replaces the old timestamp with a new one, the entity will find it out by checking the signature R si .
For the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al., as there is not a signature or a timestamp in message Id A , R A , WT A , if an adversary sends a former message to a legitimate entity, this entity will accept this message. If an adversary keeps sending former messages to this entity, the entity has to deal with these messages and it will not be accessible to the other legitimate entities in the system.
B. MESSAGE INTEGRITY
For the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al., as there is not a signature in message Id A , R A , WT A , if this message is tampered or altered by an adversary, and sent to a legitimate entity, the receiver is unable to find out if this message has been tampered with or altered by an adversary. Thus, their scheme cannot ensure the integrity of the message. Besides, as there is not a signature in this message, their scheme cannot ensure authentication on this message neither.
C. PRIVATE KEY PRIVACY
For the private key privacy, in the proposed scheme, the private key of an arbitrary entity is d i = e i · (k n + k u ) + d x , the network manager knows d x , e i and k n , however, it does not know k u , it is unable to know the private key of an arbitrary entity, the probability the network manager learns the private key of an entity by guessing is 1 2 224 . On the other hand, the probability an entity learns the private key of the network manager by guessing is 1 2 224 , too. This is the same as that of the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al, which means the two schemes have the same security level.
However, in the scheme of Mahmood et al., the private key of an arbitrary entity is generated by the network manager, the network manager knows the private key of all the entities.
D. PRIVATE KEY LEAKAGE PROBLEM
For the scheme of Mahmood et al., once an adversary learns the session ephemeral information x i , and the public information Id i , X i , Y i , K ip , t i and Id j , X j , Y j , K jp , the adversary is able to get the private key of an entity as:
In this way, their scheme has the potential private key leakage problem.
E. PERFECT FORWARD PRIVACY
For the scheme of Mahmood et al., once the private key of an entity is compromised, for example, if an adversary coincidentally learns a private key K is , the adversary is able to compute the shared key SK = H 3 (x i X j ), as 
For the proposed scheme, even if the private keys of both entities are leaked, the adversary is unable to get the shared key of the past sessions.
F. EARLY DETECTION OF ILLEGAL MESSAGE
In some cases, an adversary sends fake messages to a legitimate entity to deplete its computation ability, thus the ability to find out if a message is a fake one or not is important. For the scheme of Mahmood et al., if an adversary send a fake message {Id 1 , X 1 , Y 1 , K 1 , t 1 } to an entity, Id 1 is a random identity, X 1 and K 1 are random elements of G 1 , and Y 1 is a random number, the recipient entity cannot know if this is a legitimate message or not, he will conducts the same steps as he does in the normal way.
For the scheme of Abbasinezhad et al. If an adversary sends a fake message {Id 1 , R 1 , WT 1 } to a legitimate entity V j , where Id 1 is a random identity, R 1 and WT 1 are random elements of G 1 . Entity V j is unable to judge whether this is a legitimate message or not. However, if an adversary keeps sending these messages, entity V j will get busy dealing with these messages, and it will not be accessible to other legitimate entities.
For the proposed scheme, if an adversary sends a fake message {Id i , R in , R i1 , R si , T 1 } to entity V j . V j can find out this message is not a legitimate one by checking the timestamp and the signature in the following steps. If an adversary keeps sending fake messages, V j will reject the messages from this source.
Entity
, which is an element of G 1 , and
if they are equal, V j accepts the message, otherwise, V j abandons the messages.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we first analyzed existing schemes, we found the two of them failed to provide all the security features as they claimed, and both of them have potential security issues, for example, private key leakage problem. Thus, we proposed a pairing based authentication scheme for smart grid scenario, which gains more security features compared to related works, for example, the proposed scheme ensures private key privacy, perfect forward privacy and message integrity etc. We designed a simpler registration scheme, the computation cost is reduced. However, compared to related work, the proposed registration scheme implements the same functionalities, and achieves the same or a higher security level. We conducted a formal security analysis of the proposed authentication scheme, the result shows the scheme is secure. The analysis of BAN logic also shows that the proposed scheme is secure. In addition, we implemented the scheme in a Java environment, we validate our analysis of communication overhead and computation overhead. In all, the proposed scheme gains an advantage as it has more security features and a comparable computation cost and communication cost.
APPENDIX
Here are the parameters of the elliptic curve used in the experiment. 
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